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ZONING-THE NON-CONFORMING USE AND SPOT ZONING
HISTORY AND PURPOSES
In its generally acknowledged meaning, the term "zoning" refers to governmental regulation of the uses to which private property may be put. However, in its stricter legal parlance the term is defined as the division of municipalities into districts '--each district representing a category of human activity
in varying degrees of desirability-with an overall sort of code to restrict the
extension of designated property uses beyond the territorial limits of a given
district or zone. As an integral part of city planning 2 the municipal zoning
power serves to stabilize and enhance property values and to improve the environment of municipal citizens.3 The resultant benefits extend all the way from
those in terms of health, safety and morals to those involving aesthetic considerations. 4
Informal zoning practices can be traced back to the time of the Middle
Ages when European cities restricted the employment of certain trade activities
to specific streets and districts. At the close of the nineteenth century several
German cities legislated in order to enjoin the establishment of undesirable
industries in dose proximity to residential areas. This initial effort was followed
by the creation of so-called "protected districts" from which objectionable uses
were excluded.5 In the United States zoning ordinances were initiated at about
the turn of the century when citizens of our larger cities embarked upon legislative programs aimed at restricting the uses for which property might be occupied.6 The impetus for property use limitations came both from the recognition of a need for systematized urban growth and the realization that offensive
uses in residential districts should be curbed. The zoning pattern thus established has become a standard for subsequent ordinances whose primary purpose
1. The customary zones or districts are residential, business and Industrial.
2. "Zoning ordinances are ordinarily enacted to adopt a comprehensive
plan for a municipality and bring about an orderly development thereof" 58
Am. Jur. 957.
3. In sociological terms, zoning is said to promote to municipal citizens comfort, happiness, public pride and public order. This purpose is accomplished largely through an emphasis on maintaining socially desirable residential districts,
either by protecting those already established or those to be developed. The
difficulty arises from -the fact that initially cities were not planned; their growth
arose out of the necessities and desires of man without regard to systematic
arrangement.
4. See Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N. Y. 167, 18 N. E. 2d 18 (1938);
appeal dismissed, 308 U. S. 503 (1939).
5. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Vol. XV) 538.
6. New York City enacted the first noteworthy zoning ordinance in 1916.
This statute represents the beginning of conscientious American efforts toward
planned city growth.
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is served by promulgation of use restrictions aimed at directing the most beneficial occupancy of both urban and rural realty.7
STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN USE RESTRICTIONS
It is inconceivable that a zoning system could be evolved without the deprivation of someone's rights and, therefore, it was inevitable that zoning ordinances would eventually have to withstand constitutional attack in the courts.
Basically the constitutional problems involved in zoning ordinances resolve about
an approximation of the public interest in zoning as against private interests in
property." When these two determinants are inharmonious the public welfare
factor will generally suppress the rights which spring from ownership of private
property. Thus zoning classifications or prohibitions authorized by statute which
have a reasonable relation to promoting the general welfare, health, safety,
morals, etc. and are not arbitrary or capricious are constitutional even though
they have an adverse effect upon specific private property rights and delimit
free indiscriminate uses.9 The net result is an ability on the part of a municipality to guide the scope of private uses into those categories, reasonably arrived at,
considered most beneficial to the public at large 10---the prevention of private
uses which under the circumstances are detrimental to the community as a
whole."
However, every interference upon private property rights which is an aid
to the general welfare will not be condoned by the courts. The interference it7. Rural zoning is primarily directed at restricting scattered farm settlement which would create burdens on "schools, roads, and administrative functionings and most important, to secure the best possible advantages from planned
utilization of natural resources.

8. U..S. Constitution, Amendments V., XIV.

9. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, (1926) the U. S.
Supreme Court, in upholding the legality of a general zoning ordinance under
due process attack from the Fourteenth Amendment, enunciated what today is
the firmly established doctrine. Namely, that zoning, if reasonable and uniform,
is a valid exercise of the broad and expanding police power. See Wolfson v.
Burden, 241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 120 (1925); Baddour v. City of Long Beach, supra,
N. 4.
10. Zoning plans however do not completely do away with the power of
private individuals to control the use of land by means of contract or deed. A
zoning measure cannot constitutionally release land within a zoned district from
lawful private restrictions affecting its use. Worenburg v. Burnell, 257 Mass.
399, 153 N. E. 884 (1926); Gordon v. Caldwell, 325 Ill. App. 170, 154 N. E. 642
(1926). Private agreements in extention of zoning prohibitions are of course ineffectual.
11. It is generally considered sufficient if it appears reasonable that the
legislature in enacting the ordinance had a phase of public welfare in mind.
Legislative declarations will not control but the courts realize that municipal

governments are better able to estimate the need than is the judiciary.
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self must not be unreasonable and should be kept within the limits of necessity. 1 2
Restrictions, although in the public interest, which go too far will amount
to a "taking and as such must be compensated for under the terms of the Constitution.13 Ordinances which permanently restrict the use of property so that
it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose go beyond regulation and must
be recognized as a taking of the property.14 In order to guard against restrictions which approach actual expropriation, special privileges of variation of a
temporary nature may be granted, either to individual property owners or owners
as a class, so as to allow for a temporary productive use until the time when surrounding circumstances so change that the prohibition upon the particular property no longer remains unreasonable. 15
NON-CONFORMING USES
One of the major problems in effective zoning is the non-conforming use,
that is, one which does not comply with the use district61 in which it is located.
It had long been the accepted view that a non-conforming use existing at the inception of a zoning ordinance could not be prohibited or-restricted if the use
was lawful and not a public nuisance nor harmful in any way to public health,
12. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. 2d
587 (1938); People ex. rel. St. Albans-Springfield Corp. v. Connell, 257 N. Y. 73,
177 N. E. 313 (1931).
13. See Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahen, 260 U. S. 393

(1922).
14. Where a private property is "taken" it must be expropriated for public
use and the owner must be afforded a just compensation for his loss. See Cordts
v. Hutton Co., 266 N. Y. 399, 195 N. E. 124 (1934); also see I Bflo. L. Rev. 147.
However, a temporary hardship of holding unproductive property might be
compensated for by ultimate benefit to the owner or, even without such compensation, the individual owners might be compelled to bear a temporary burden

in order to promote the public good. Averne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher,
supra,N. 12.

15. Supra, N. 14. Most zoning statutes and ordinances provide for boards
of appeal, review, or adjustment with power to grant variances subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards. See 58 Am. Jur. 976.
In New York a zoning variance may be granted only upon a showing that
the land cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for the purpose allowed
in the zone, and that the use sought will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood. But it should be noted that where the hardship caused by a zoning
ordinance is general and characteristic of the entire area, the remedy lies In a
revision of the ordinance through legislative action and not in the granting of

a variance to a single property owner. Taxpayers' Association of South East
Oceanside et al. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 301 N. Y.

215, 93 N. E. 2d. 645 (1950).
16. Supra, N. 1.
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safety, morals or welfare. 17 It was thought that to do so would be applying
the ordinance retroactively which, in most instances, would be an unreasonable,
unjustifiable exercise of the police power and therefore unconstitutional.' 8
However, since it was the policy and spirit of comprehensive zoning to
restrict non-conforming uses so far as possible, legislatures have provided statutory means for their gradual elimination via abandonment' 9 and non use 20, destruction whether voluntary or involuntary, 2' limitations on repair and altera17. Ryan v. Andriano, 91 Cal. App. 136, 266 Pac. 831 (1928); Village of North
Hornell v. Rauber, 188 Misc. 546, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1947); People v.
Stanton, 125 Misc. 215, 211 N. Y. Supp. 438 (Cty. Ct. 1926). A ,fortiori, provisions
in zoning ordinances exempting from their operation uses already existing at the
time of their enactment have been held valid. Magruder v. Redwood, 203 Cal.
665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928); Sampere v. New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928),
affirmed without opinion in 297 U. S. 812 (1928); Ballard v. Roth, 141 Misc. 316,
253 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
18. Jones 'v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1931); Pelham
View Apartments Inc. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
19. An abandonment connotes a voluntary, affirmative act. Longo v. Rilers,
196 Misc. 909, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1949). There must be a concurring
intention to abandon and an actual relinquishment of the right. Mere non use
of property over a period of time does not amount to an abandonment. City of
Binghampton v. Cartell, 275 App. Div. 457, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (3rd dept. 1949);
see also 58 Arm Jur. 1024. Some minority decisions hold the word "discontinue"
in an ordinance equivalent to "abandonment" State ex. rel. Schaetz v. Manders,
206 Wisc. 121, 238 N. W. 835 (1931); Haller Baking Co., Appeal of, 295 Pa. 257,
145 Ati. 77 (1928).
20. Franmor Realty Corp. v. Le Boeuf et al,
-Misc., 104 N. Y. S.
2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1951) sustained the constitutional validity of a village zoning
ordinance prohibiting resumption of a non-conforming use which had been discontinued for more than twelve months. c. f. Bsezedes et. al. v. Board of Commissioners of Arapohoe County, 116 Colo. 123, 178 Pac. 2d 950 (1947). Wilson v.
Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 Pac. 623 (1923) held compulsory termination after

180 days non-use not to be unreasonable nor unconstitutional.
21. Zoning ordinances providing that, if more than a certain percentage
of the value of a non-conforming building is destroyed by fire or other cause,

the right to replace the non-conforming building is terminated, have been held
to be valid. Koeber v. Bedell, 254 App. Div. 584, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 108, (2d dept.) affirmed, 280 N. Y. 692, 21 N. E. 2d 200 (1939); Navin v. Eary,-Mis., 56
N. Y. S. 2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1945); also see McQuillin on Municipal Corporations
(Vol. VIII, 3rd Ed.) 382.
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ion,2 and compulsory termination within a specified time period. Compulsory
termination represents the most effective method for eventual elimination of
non-comforming uses. Initially, application of this type of termination was
severely limited by the courts. In 1932 the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Standard Oil Company v. City of Bowling Green et. al.2 3 unanimously held invalid
an attempt to apply a municipal ordinance which established a residential zone
and excluded therefrom gasoline and oil filling stations, to a station previously
established within the bounds of the district. It was stated that governmental
power to interfere with the general rights of a land owner by restricting the
character of his use was not unlimited; and that such restriction could not be
imposed in a situation where the landowner had employed the prohibited use
six years before passage of the restrictive ordinance, the general welfare was
not adversely affected by the use of the lot for such station and the lot's economic
value would practically be destroyed if the ordinance were enforced.2 4 However,
eighteen years later in the case of Standard Oil Company v. City of Tallahassee25
the U. S. Court of Appeals (fifth circuit) upheld a similar ordinance involving
substantially the same facts under constitutional attack by the same plaintiff as

22. The right to continue a non-conforming use necessarily embraces what
is requisite for preservation such as repair and restoration. Meixnem v. Board of
Adjustment of City of Newark, 131 N. J. L. 599, 37 A 2d 678 (1944); see also
Sitgreaves v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Nutley, 136 N. J. L. 21, 54 A 2d
451 (1947); Brous v. Town of Hempstead, 272 App. Div. 31, (2d dept.) 69 N. Y. S.
2d 258 (1947). In the case of partial destruction, zoning measures commonly limit
restoration to losses not in excess of a certain percentage of the value, frequently
seventy-five per cent. Incorporated Village of North Hornell v. Rauber, supra, N.
17; Koeber v. Bedell, supra, N. 21; Navin v. Early, supra, N. 21; Appel of Berberin, 251 Pa. 475, 41 A 2d 670 (1945). Value has been interpreted to mean
financial worth not merely physical value. Jetter v. Hoffeins, 190 Misc. 99, 70
N. Y. S. 2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The right to repair or replace however does not
include structural alteration. Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 271
N. W. 826 (1937). Zoning ordinances that authorize continued use of existing nonconforming buildings usually forbid structural or substantial alteration. A. L.
Carrithers and Son v. City of Louisville, 250 Ky. 462, 63 S. W. 2d 493 (1933);
Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727 (1938). Structural alterations have
been defined as constituting those changes which are of such nature so as to
convert non-confirming buildings into new or substantially different structures or
extend the existing life of the non-conforming building. Compare Selligmen v.
Von Allmen Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S. W. 2d 207 (1944); Cole v. City of Battle
Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N. W. 466 (1941). For an extensive discussion of the
topic see McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, supra,N. 21 at 386-396.
23. 244 Ky. 362, 50 S. W. 2d 960 (1932).
24.
It is interesting to note the famous Dema Rtealty Company cases, State
ex. rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929), certiorari
denied 280 U. S. 556 (1929); State ex. rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La.
752, 123 So. 314 (1929), which provided that all the businesses then In operation
within the said area should be liquidated within one year from the date of the
passage of the ordinance was upheld by the Louisiana Court of Appeals. The
Dema Cases have been greatly criticized and never generally accepted. See Jones
v. City of Los Angeles, supra, N. 18; Franmor Realty Corp. 1). Le Boeuf, supra,
N. 20; also see 86 A. L. R. 688.
25. 183 F 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
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appeared in the Bowling Green case? 6l Judge McCord, speaking for the majority
27
of the court stated:
"We find no merit in the appellant's contention that enforcement
of this ordinance would entail any unjust discrimination, or would
be tantamount to depriving it of its property without due process
of law merely because the site was acquired and improved at considerable expense before the zoning ordinance was enacted. The general
rule here applicable is that considerations of financial loss or so-called
'vested rights' in property are insufficient to outweigh the necessity for
legitimate exercise of the police power of the municipality."28
The Tallahassee case crystallizes the modern trend of thought by law makers
and city planners respecting non-conforming uses, i. e. that the presence of
any non-conforming use will endanger the benefit to be derived from the zoning plan. It is to be noted however that although the court failed to mention
the fact, the ordinance in question provided for a plan of amortization; that
is. a plan whereby a temporary continuation of non-conforming uses is permitted with an allowance for their elimination only after the expiration of a
specified period of time. 9 It is submitted that use of an amortization scheme
provides the most equitable means for reconciliation of the conflicting interests
in satisfaction of due process requirements and that probably in the absence
thereof the Supreme Court would not be disposed to uphold the enactment
THE SPOT ZONING CONCEPT
The legislative power to authorize the adoption of general zoning ordinances in cities is well settled. 3 That power in New York State is delegated to
municipalities and empowers the local sovereign power:
"To regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and
the location of buildings designed for specific uses, and for said purpose to divide the city into districts and to prescribe for each such
district the trades and industries that shall be excluded or subjected
to special regulation and the uses for which buildings may not be
erected or altered."
It is further provided that:
"Such regulations shall be designed to promote the public health,
26. Supra, N. 23.
27. p. 712.

28. Appellant's petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. 340
U. S. 832, (1950).
29. See 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1019.

30. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E.

209 (1920).
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safety and general welfare and shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property values and
the direction of building development in accord with a well-considered
3
plan." 1
The implications of the enabling statute clearly indicate a strong policy
that zoning should proceed in accordance with a definite policy and not in a haphazard manner. It has been held that where there has been no attempt to adopt
a definite policy a sporadic regulation will not fall within the delegated authority
and will be invalid. 3 2 Where a comprehensive zoning plan has been established
under the terms of the enabling statute, indiscriminate variance provisions within
a classified district will be stricken down by the court. Ergo, the rule stated has
been that an ordinance cannot create an "island" of more or less restricted uses
where there are no pertinent differentiating factors between the "island" and the
district. 33 It is not permissible to single out one lot located within what is essentially a single district and impose restrictions upon that lot that are more or
less onerous than those imposed upon the remaining portions of the same zoning
district.
The crux of the problem lies in the determination of those restrictions which
constitute inconsistencies or discriminations within a given district in contrast
to mere reasonably determined altruistic variances. It is established that a zoning
ordinance is not invalid per se because it permits small areas scattered throughout residential sections to be zoned for business uses, thereby permitting the
residential districts to become "spotted."34 The boundary line between invalid
inconsistencies and unobjectionable spot zoning largely depends upon whether
the ordinance which provides for incongruous uses within a singular district is
characterized as for the good of the general public and in pursuance of a general
or comprehensive plan as distinguished from the granting of a special privilege
or imposition of a special restriction35 Therefore, the analyst's approach must
be one calculated to determine whether the so-called lot or haphazard zoning
firstly bears a reasonable relation to the public health, morals, safety or general
welfare and secondly is in pursuance of a unified plan. Ordinarily an overriding
general welfare relationship factor will not be difficult to establish and the critical
element will become the existence of a comprehensive plan. It is submitted that
whether or not a comprehensive plan does exist will be evidenced by:
31. General City Law p 20 sec. 25; Italics supplied.
32. City of Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 195 N. Y. Supp. 225 (4th
dept. 1942).
33. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (Supra, N. 21 at 145).
34. See 12 Cal. Jur. Ten Year Supp. (126-136) 158.
35. See Bowen v, Hider,--Misc., 37 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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1-The substantiality of the public benefit 36 which is resultant from the
non-district type of zoning-the less substantial the benefit the more apparent
must a definite or comprehensive plan appear.3 7
2-The uniqueness of the areas within the district in regard to the district
as a whole and also in regard to the municipality as a whole-fringe areas are
most unique.3 s
3-Whether the words of the statute or amendment which designate the
particular area describe the area by metes and bounds or describe it in general
terms applicable to various places within the area. Validity is enhanced through
the use of broadly termed designations. 9
Although the spot zoning concept as such has not been awarded any great
amount of judicial sanction the value of this haphazard property use control should
not be lost sight of in cases where mixed zoning within a particular district is
called for as a part of city planning for maximum public benefits.
CONCLUSION
I. The zoning concept gives force and effect to the historicaly recognized
fact that municipal growth must be directed according to a well planned scheme
of development. Its justification lies in the existence of resultant benefits flowing
to the public welfare. When there are no concurrent public benefit factors the
sovereign police power will not be evoked into the legislation and the zoning
plan will fail since the zoning power must be predicated upon an exertion of
the police power.
IL The sovereign's ability to restrict certain undesirable property uses may
not be so extended that an actual expropriation of property takes place. Where
the restrictions are of unreasonable severity the due process clause will preponder36. The term "public benefit" may refer to the municipal
in toto or
merely to that portion of the public residing within the districtpublic
subject to spot
zoning.
37. Compare Bowen v. Hider, supra, N. 35, and also Marshall v. Salt Lake
City, 105 Utah 111, 141 Pac. 2d 704 (1943).
38. See Bowen v. Hider, supra, N. 35, and also Marshall v. Salt Lake City,
suma, N. 37.
39. See Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wisc. 213, 1 N. W. 2d 84, (1941). Compare Mueller v. Hoffmeister Undertaking and Livery Co.,
343 Mo. 431, 121
W.
2d 775 (1938). The greatest number of cases wherein zoning laws have S.been
sustained not withstanding their classification of small areas for purposes
not
permitted in the larger surrounding areas have been" those where the zoning
ordinance permits small areas scattered throughout residential sections to
be
zoned for business uses. 58 Am. Jur. 966.
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ate to preclude an interference based upon the zoning power or in the alternative
to require the payment of a just compensation for the taking incurred.
IlL Because the necessity for zoning regulation ordinarily appears after
offensive uses within a district have called for relief and zoning ordinances in
that they are of a universal nature or applied to districts wherein human activity
is varied, the existence of the so-called non-conforming uses and their elimination
presents a perplexing question. Compulsory elimination of such uses is the most
effective guarantee for procurement of uniformity in uses within a district. The
court will not sanction an order for immediate discontinuance in respect to the
well established non-conforming user. However, a definite trend has evolved in
support of compulsory termination where the zoning authority provides for an
amortization plan which embodies a reasonable period for mandatory discontinuance of the non-conforming use.
IV. The spot zoning proposition is also grounded in considerations of uniformity. Where the legislative establishment of inconsistent uses is for private
aggrandizement the uses will be stricken down as improper. Nevertheless the
trend in judicial thinking properly repudiates the idea that spot zoning per se is
invalid. Consequently where there is some demonstrable benefit to the public involved and where there appears a uniformity or generality in consideration, spot
zoning will be upheld as a valid exercise of sovereign authority.
V. Recent developments both as to the problems of non-conforming uses
and spot zoning well illustrate a purposeful, far-sighted approach toward solution
of the desire for planned city growth without prejudice either to private or public
interests.
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